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COMMENTS
Halting A National Sacrilege: Aliens
Should Be Given Notice Of Their Right
To Apply For Political Asylum
I.

INTRODUCTION*

It has been a time-honored policy of the United States to respond
to the urgent need of persons subject to persecution in their homelands.' Congress recognized this policy in 1952 when it passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 2 which authorized the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of aliens who would be subject to "physical persecution" if deported.3 Subsequent amendments
to the INA were periodically enacted to conform national policy to its
humanitarian principles. 4 The Refugee Act of 19805 is the culmina* The author gratefully acknowledges Professors Christopher May and Larry Solum
for their suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Kathy Nelson, my
wife, and to Jeff Cohen for their support and assistance in preparing this article.
1. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212; 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C. (1982)) ("The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the United
States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands
.... "); see also Proposed Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act: Hearings on
HR. 9112, HR. 15092 and H.R. 173370 Before Subcomm. No. 1 ofthe House Comm. on the
Judiciary,91 st Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 57 (1970) (opening statement of Congressman Peter Rodino
who noted the inadequacy of existing laws dealing with refugees and stated "[wle must uphold
America's tradition as an asylum for the oppressed.").
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (currently
codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)).
3. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 583 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). This grant of authority to the Attorney General
was originally discretionaryin nature. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414,
§ 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)). The
section originally read: "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject
to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such
reason." In 1965, the Act was amended to substitute "persecution on account of race, religion,
or political opinion" for "physical persecution." Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-263, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1982)). The return of an alien to a country where he would face persecution has
come to be called refoulement. Note, ProtectingAliens from Persecution Without Overloading
the INS: Should IllegalAliens Receive Notice ofthe Right to Apply for Asylum? 69 VA L. REV.
901, 901 (1983).
4. See, e.g., supra note 3 and the 1965 amendment to the INA.
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tion of this liberalization of United States' immigration law. This Act
established, for the first time, a comprehensive refugee assistance and
resettlement policy 6 in response to a rapid increase in the number of
asylum applications. 7 In contrast to its predecessor provision, section
243(h) of the new law prohibits the Attorney General from deporting
aliens to countries where they would face persecution on account of
race, religion or political opinion. 8 Furthermore, the measure directed the Attorney General to establish a uniform procedure to handle asylum claims. 9 Pursuant to section 208(a), 10 the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, grant asylum upon a showing of a
"well-founded fear" of persecution."1 By directing the establishment
of a single asylum application procedure, new section 208 recognizes
5. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (1982)). President Carter signed the Act on March 17, 1980. Id.
6. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 141, 141 [hereinafter S. REP.].
7. Statistics indicate the number of asylum claims increased from 2,529 per year to over
63,000 in 1981. Moreover, while the number of yearly applicants processed reached 4,529 in
1981, the number of claims pending soared to 102,544. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.
Supp. 351, 379 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The increase in applications was due in large part to the
Cuban Freedom Flotilla of 1980. In fiscal year 1981 alone, over 36,000 Cubans petitioned for
asylum with District Directors pursuant to INA section 208. The number of aliens applying
for asylum with District Directors has leveled off in recent years. INS figures indicate that in
1982 over 33,000 claims were filed though this number dipped to approximately 17,000 in
1985. The number of claims pending as of September, 1985, was 126,311.
8. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (amending
§ 243(h) of the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
9. S. REP., supra note 6, at 9. Prior to the Act, the government reacted to refugee crises
on a piecemeal approach as they arose. The expansive Indochinese refugee program exposed
the untenability of this reactionary policy. S. REP., supra note 6, at 3.
10. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (adding § 208(a)
to the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)). This section directs the Attorney General
to "establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States ... to apply for
asylum."
11. Controversy exists as to the standard of proof an alien must meet to demonstrate
eligibility for asylum. The confusion focuses upon whether the "well-founded fear" of persecution standard necessary to establish eligibility for a grant of asylum differs from the harsh
"clear probability" of persecution standard which prohibits deportation. The "clear
probability" burden requires the alien to show that "it is more likely than not" that he will be
persecuted. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984). In Stevic, the Supreme Court assumed,
without deciding, that the "well-founded fear" standard is "more generous" than the "clear
probability" benchmark. Id. at 425. Following Stevic, the Ninth, Seventh, and Sixth circuits
have all unequivocally held that the "well-founded fear" standard is, in fact, less stringent than
the "clear probability" standard. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.
1985). The mandatory prohibition against refoulement was deemed to justify a tougher standard of proof than the discretionary grant of asylum. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d
1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1984). The United States Supreme Court has recently agreed to determine the applicable asylum standard and resolve the lingering confusion. INS v. Cardoza-
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asylum as a legal concept for the first time in United States law.' 2
Judicial awareness of the purposes and provisions of the Act has
led two federal district courts to conclude that aliens should be given
notice of the right to petition for asylum.' 3 These courts have been
persuaded that the United States has, by accession to the 1968 United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and concomitant
enactment of a comprehensive asylum program, manifested its intention to hear refugee claims. ' 4 In light of the capacities and characteristics of most aliens, notice was viewed as essential to preserve the
substance and meaning of this right. 15 Moreover, one court has declared notice to be constitutionally prescribed by the due process

clause of the United States Constitution.' 6 A protectible interest was
found in the mandatory withholding of deportation language of section 243(h) and the newly-enacted asylum adjudicatory scheme. '7
Utilizing the traditional interest-balancing formula to determine the
Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1986)
(No. 85-782).
12. S. REP., supra note 6, at 9. The word "asylum" did not appear in United States'
immigration laws prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. Note, supra note 3, at
902 n. 10; see also Caribbean Migration: Oversight Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 279 (1980) [hereinafter CaribbeanMigration] (statement from the American Council of
Voluntary Agencies for Former Service, Inc., noting that asylum was given a legislative basis
for the first time in the nation's history through the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act).
13. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (The court
ordered notice to all Salvadorans eligible to apply for political asylum in order to compensate
for alleged abuses by INS agents in obtaining voluntary departure consents.); Nunez v. Boldin,
537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th
Cir. 1982) (In contrast to the expansive holding of Orantes-Hernandez,the Nunez court ordered notice to all Guatemalans and Salvadorans held at the INS detention center in Los
Fresnos, Texas.). Despite their broad language, these rulings did not mandate blanket notice
to all aliens but compelled notice to the affected class. The need for blanket notice was not an
issue before the courts.
14. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1984); Orantes-Hernandez v.
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D.
Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
15. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
16. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584-86 (S.D. Tex.), appealdismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
17. The withholding of deportation mandate of section 243(h) does not technically confer
asylum though the courts have on occasion interpreted it as such. Comment, PoliticalAsylum
and Withholding of Deportation: Defining the AppropriateStandardof Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 176-77 (1983). The benefits granted under the
two forms of relief differ. For example, an alien who receives asylum has an automatic right
after one year to apply for adjustment of status to permanent resident alien. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 209.2 (1984); see also Korn, Hiding in the Open, Student Law., Jan. 1986, at 26 col. 2 (article
deals with the recent refugee sanctuary movement).
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process necessary to safeguard this right, the court concluded that the
alien's interest in nonrefoulement outweighed the additional cost to
18
the government.
Despite these district court pronouncements, no circuit court has
found a congressionally or constitutionally based notice obligation. 19
Deference has been given to current INS20 practice which alerts aliens
of the available asylum procedures only if the alien acts to flag asylum
claims. 21 This policy ostensibly strikes the appropriate balance between a blanket notice requirement and the inevitable increase in nonmeritorious asylum requests which a notice obligation would entail. 22
Though not overruling the lower court decisions, these circuit holdings limit the reach of the district court cases to their facts. Only
through exercise of the broad equitable powers may a district court
compel notice to remedy procedural abuses. 23 The INS is thus left to
its own devices in alerting aliens of their right to submit asylum
24
claims.
18. Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 586 ("It is true that giving such notice may result in unworthy
claims being filed and in a longer than necessary detention for some aliens. The Court is of the
opinion, however, that this possibility does not override the need for those with worthy claims
to have them heard.").
19. See Duran v. INS, 756 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding INS regulations do
not require an immigration judge to notify an alien of his right to apply for asylum or withholding of deportation); Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984); cf. Minwalla v.
INS, 706 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1983) (court assumed, without deciding, that due process
entitles an alien to notice of the right to apply for asylum).
20. The Attorney General has delegated his control over immigration procedures to the
INS, a branch of the Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. § 100.2 (1983).
21. Caribbean Migration, supra note 12, at 225. "[Aliens] are interviewed as to why they
came here. If they have questions that would flag asylum claims such as fear of persecution
upon being returned, they are identified. Those persons are told what their rights are ..
Id. (statements by David Crosland, Acting Commissioner for the INS).
22. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 946 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e have no basis for
discounting the INS judgment that [notice] would generate . . . large numbers of frivolous
claims ..
"); Note, supra note 3, at 903, 923.
23. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("In
order to mitigate the coercive effect [of the interrogative] environment, the Court in the exercise of its broad remedial powers believes that a mandatory notice of rights is appropriate.").
24. The decision to leave notice to the discretion of the INS is of questionable utility to
the alien. Chief Counsel for the INS admitted to the Orantes-Hernandezcourt that the INS
and its agents are very reluctant to divulge any information regarding the asylum process.
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 361 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Along these lines, some
aliens who have requested an opportunity to apply for asylum have been told that asylum is
unavailable. And, some aliens who have expressed fear of persecution upon refoulement were
similarly denied notice. Id. These abuses are clear violations of the Refugee Act and the INS'
own notice procedures for which remedial action is justified. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957,
983 n.35 (11 th Cir. 1984). Despite this equitable relief, practical problems arise if the alien has
signed a voluntary departure form and has already been deported before the violation is
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This Comment argues that notice is mandated both by congressional intent and due process principles. 25 Congressional silence is
not dispositive of an implied acceptance to adhere to current INS procedures. The purposes and provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act evince
Congress' desire to adhere to our national commitment to resolution
of the refugee problem. Notice is consistent with compliance to this
dedication. Moreover, due process requires blanket notice to all deportable aliens of their right to petition for asylum. Neither the fiscal
nor administrative cost of notice justifies a foregoing of this procedural protection. Any appreciable increase in expenditures results
primarily from the hearing process designed to accord the alien an
opportunity to be heard before the final order of deportation. Constitutional principles likewise mandate that any waiver by the alien forsaking his right to a deportation proceeding must be knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily executed to accord him all the process
that is his due. With these thoughts in mind, a survey look to the
evolution of United States' policy towards refugees crystallizes the
congressional attitude behind the Refugee Act, thereby setting the
backdrop for analysis of any notice obligation to be gleaned from the
measure.
brought to light. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Tex.), appealdismissed without
published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).

25. This Comment argues for notice to those aliens upon whom an order to show cause
has been issued. This order notifies the alien that the process to deport him has begun. See 8
C.F.R. § 242.1 (1985). The class is further limited to deportable aliens and does not include
excludable aliens who are presently accorded no constitutional rights. Landon v. Plasencia,

459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). A deportable alien is an individual who has entered the United States
whether legally or illegally. An excludable alien, by contrast, may have reached the border but

has not affected an entry. Jean v. Nelson 727 F.2d 957, 961 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
excludable aliens have no congressional or constitutional right to notice of the right to apply
for asylum). It is the deportable alien's presence within the Court's territorial jurisdiction that
gives the Judiciary power to act and extend to them these constitutional rights. Johnson v.

Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950). Though the excludable alien is accorded less rights
than the deportable alien, see generally Landon, 459 U.S. at 25-26 for a comparison of the
rights of these two alien classes, certain rights common to both classes blurs the distinction

between the two. For instance under 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1985), asylum requests made after
the initiation of exclusion proceedings are also considered as requests for withholding of deportation. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise of Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1391-96 (1953), for the view that excludable aliens
should be accorded due process protections.
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National Policy Relating to Refugees

The story of United States' immigration law dealing with refugees 27 unfolds with the onset of the twentieth century. 28 From this

time until 1980, the existing refugee programs were a patchwork of
responses to emergency crises.29 The earliest of these measures recognized the plight of the political refugee by exempting them from exclusion as criminals. 30 These acts reflected a desire to regulate the
quality of aliens admitted to the country. 31 At the conclusion of
World War I, fear of inundation from aliens leaving war torn Europe
coupled with a post-war isolationist mood created pressure for immigration reform. 32 The result was the 1924 "national origins" quota
system which placed numerical limitations on immigration but was
silent regarding political refugee admissions. 33 World War II and its
aftermath motivated legislative relaxation of these existing quota restrictions. 34 The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 35 and its Amend26. The structure of the historical section of this Comment follows closely the historical
framework from Comment, PoliticalAsylum and Withholding of Deportation: Defining the
Appropriate Standard of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171,
174-80 (1983). For a detailed report of United States law dealing with refugees see Anker &
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 9 (1981); Evans, The PoliticalRefugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice
3 INT'L LAW 204 (1969).

27. Refugees are individuals who are outside the United States seeking political asylum.
Conversely, asylees are individuals who have entered the United States and are seeking political asylum. Comment, supra note 26, at 176 n.34.
28. Id. at 174 & n.22.
29. Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 12. S. REP., supra note 6, at 4 (Emphasizing the
need for permanent, and systematic refugee procedures, Ambassador Dick Clark noted
"[u]ntil now, we have carried out our refugee programs through... a patchwork of different
programs that evolved in response to specific crises.").
30. Evans, supra note 26, at 207-08 ("The Acts of 1875, 1882, and 1891 excepted a person convicted of a political offense from exclusion as a criminal."). Section 5, 18 Stat. 477
(1875); § 4, 22 Stat. 214 (1882); § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891). "The political offender was also
recognized in the [1917] Act which provided: 'That nothing in this Act shall exclude, if otherwise admissible, persons convicted, or who admit the commission, or who teach or advocate
the commission, of an offense purely political.' " Evans, supra note 26, at 208 (quoting the
1917 Immigration Act § 3, 39 Stat. 877).
31. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURES § 1.2
(1985).
32. Id.
33, Id. ("The 1924 legislation [43 Stat. 153 (1924)] adopted a national origins formula
which eventually based the quota for each nationality on the number of persons of their national origin in the United States in 1920 ....

Quota immigrants were limited to approxi-

mately 150,000 per year."); see also Evans, supra note 26, at 208.
34. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 31, at § 1.2d.
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set highly selective standards for sanctuary and was
primarily an aid to those individuals who fled Nazi or Soviet persecution. 37 This legislation struck a balance between humanitarian concern for refugees and the existing cold war sentiment. 38 Under this
program, the United States welcomed some 400,000 persons to its
shores in three and one-half years. 39 Despite its breadth, the Act was
not a permanent refugee policy, 4° but a special legislative authoriza41
tion to an international problem.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was enacted in
1952 to establish quotas for immigrants who wished to become permanent United States residents. 42 Like its predecessors, this measure
contained no specific refugee admission provision. 43 The 1952 Act
was primarily a reaction to the anti-communist attitudes of the time."4
The emphasis of the measure was less on humanitarian principles
than on lending support and morale to anti-communists. 45 In this
ments,

35. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
36. Amendment to Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219
(1950). The 1950 Amendment encouraged anti-communist activity in the Soviet Union and
China by providing new visas to be issued to anti-communist refugees. The 1951 Amendment
extended the Act an additional six months. Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96 (1951).
37. Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 13; Comment, supra note 26, at 174.
38. Evans, supra note 26, at 213. The concern for national security prevalent in the postwar period is epitomized by a 1950 amendment to the 1918 Anarchist Act [40 Stat. 1012
(1918)] which read:
No visas shall be issued under the provisions of this Act, as amended, to any person
who is or has been a member of the Communist Party, or to any person who adheres
to, advocates, or follows, or who has adhered to, advocated, or followed, the principles of any political or economic system or philosophy directed toward the destruction of free competitive enterprise and the revolutionary overthrow of representative
governments ....
Evans, supra note 26, at 213 (quoting Section 11, 64 Stat. 227, amending the 1918 Act).
39. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 31, at § 1.2d.
40. Comment, supra note 26, at 174.
41. Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 12-13; Evans, supra note 26, at 211-12; C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 31, § 2.2Aa at 2-185.
42. Comment, supra note 26, at 175. President Truman vetoed the 1952 Act because it
maintained the "national origins" quota system established by the 1924 Act. The inherent
discriminatory effect of the policy was thought anathema to American ideals. The President's
veto, however, was overridden by Congress. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 31, at
§ 1.3a. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all shared a similar abhorrence to the
"national origins" system. 111 CONG. REC. H21768 (Aug. 25, 1965) (statement of Rep. Clausen). The 1965 Amendments to the INA finally dispensed with the "national origins" quota
system and its emphasis upon race and nationality. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra
note 31, § 1.4c at 1-26.
43. Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 14 & n.18.
44. Id. at 13, 15; see also Note, The Endless Debate: Refugee Law andPolicy and the 1980
Refugee Act, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117, 122 (1983-84).
45. Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 175; Comment, supra note 26, at 175.
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respect, the Act extended the tone of the modifications to the 1948
46
Displaced Persons Act.
In 1965 the INA was amended to provide the first permanent
statutory basis for refugee admissions.4 7 Under new section 203 (a)
(7), a quota was established for refugees fleeing Middle Eastern or
communist-dominated Eastern European countries because of persecution or a fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion. 48 Since it was assumed that most refugees came from these
two geographic areas, 4 9 only refugees from locations mentioned in
section 203(a)(7) were allowed to apply for asylum until the Refugee
Act of 1980 liberalized this geographic restriction. 50
The 1965 Amendments also enhanced an asylee's 5 l ability to
qualify for discretionary relief under INA section 243(h).52 This provision was modified to expand the concept of "persecution" beyond
the merely physical. 53 Though still lacking the right to petition for
54
asylum, the asylee's opportunity to avoid deportation was increased.
B.

The United Nations Protocol

The United States became a signatory to the United Nations Pro46. See supra note 36.
47. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911, 913 (repealed in part 1980).
48. Id. at § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (repealed in 1980). This quota was not to
exceed six percent of the total number of immigrants admissible into the country each year
(i.e., 10,200 out of 170,000). Id. See also Evans, supra note 26, at 220-21; Comment, supra
note 26, at 175; Anker & Posner, supra note 26, at 17.
49. S. REP., supra note 6, at 4 (remarks of Ambassador Dick Clark); Note, supra note 44,
at 123 ("While Cold War antagonisms were by then muted by the ideals of peaceful coexistence, American foreign policy continued to view persecution as the exclusive province of
Communism.") (footnote omitted).
50. Comment, supra note 26, at 175. One of the purposes of the Refugee Act was to
eliminate the geographical and ideological restrictions applicable under section 203(a)(7). S.
REP., supra note 6, at 4.
51. For the definition of asylee see supra note 27.
52. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911, 918.
53. See supra note 3.
54. The Amendment to § 243(h) was proposed by Representative Poff of Virginia. The
term "physical persecution" was thought too restrictive a standard. The word "persecution"
standing alone was thought too broad and flexible. Hence a compromise between the two
extremes resulted in the enacted language of the statute "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 111 CONG. REC. H21803-04 (Aug. 25, 1965) (statement of Rep.
Poff).
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tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol) in 1968.55 The
Protocol was more liberal than existing United States law in several
respects.56 First, the Attorney General was prevented from deporting
any alien to his homeland if that alien qualified as a refugee.5 7 Under
the 1965 Amendments to the INA, the Attorney General had discretion in such instances.5 8 Additionally, the term "persecution" was
defined as a threat to one's life or freedom 59 whereas the law of the
United States defined it as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive." 6 Finally, all geographic and ideological distinctions were eliminated in defining the word refugee in contrast to the
restrictive requirements established in 1965 under section 203(a)(7) of
61
the INA.
Ratification of the Protocol obligated the United States to uphold
the treaty's provisions. 62 Congress, however, did not modify the immigration laws to conform to the Protocol. 6 3 The INS 64 and the
courts 65 also refused to acknowledge the Protocol's impact on United
States' law. Failure to implement the Treaty's sections was due to the
belief that accession required no statutory changes which the INA
could not accommodate through minor administrative modifications
by the Attorney General. 66 It was not until the Refugee Act of 1980
55. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force with respect
to the United States Nov. 1, 1968.) [hereinafter Protocol].
56. Comment, supra note 26, at 177-78; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States
Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 539, 544 (1981).
57. Note, Aliens in DeportationProceedingsHave Liberty or Property Right to Seek PoliticalAsylum Which is Protectedby Due Process,Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023
(5th Cir. 1982), 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 490 (1983). Prior to the 1980 Act, only
those persons falling within the parameters of section 203(a)(7) of the INA could petition for
asylum as refugees. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Under the Refugee Act of
1980, Congress adopted the more expansive internationally adopted definition of refugee. See
infra note 72 for this definition.
58. See supra note 3.
59. Protocol, supra note 55, art. 31 at 6275.
60. Comment, supra note 26, at 178 (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir.
1969)).
61. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 31, § 2.24Ab at 2-188.6.
62. S. REP., supra note 6, at 4; Comment, supra note 26 at 178.
63. Comment, supra note 26, at 178.
64. See, e.g., In re Dunar, 14 I.& N. Dec. 310 (1973).
65. See Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded,434 U.S.
962 (1977) (holding the Attorney General had the discretionary authority to deport aliens
despite the language of the Protocol).
66. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 417 (1984) (quoting legislative officials to indicate that
"[t]he President and the Senate believed that the Protocol was largely consistent with existing
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that Congress responded to the burgeoning refugee problem 67 with a
policy that would treat all refugees evenhandedly, 68 thereby conforming with the spirit of the Protocol.
C.

The Refugee Act of 1980

The Refugee Act of 1980 set forth a comprehensive system guiding refugee admission into the United States. 69 The Congressional
purpose behind the statute was to codify the national commitment to
human rights through uniform, nondiscriminatory treatment of all
refugees.70 To this end, the Act liberalized existing law by bringing it
into conformity with the humanitarian principles embodied in the
71
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
For example, Congress substituted the restrictive conditions of section

203(a)(7) of the INA with the Protocol's internationally accepted definition of refugee. 72 Refugees from any country would now be able to
apply for asylum in the United States. 73 Moreover, those aliens present within the United States could also petition for asylum. 74 The
law."); Comment, supra note 26, at 178; Note, supra note 56, at 544-45; Note, supra note 44, at
124.
67. See supra note 7.
68. S.REP., supra note 6, at 2 (statement by Senator Kennedy expressing the need for a
refugee policy "which will treat all refugees fairly and... equally."); Comment, supra note 26,
at 179.
69. S.REP., supra note 6, at 1.
70. Id. at 3.
71. See the United Nations Protocol text section supra.
72. Under section 203(a)(7) only refugees from Middle-Eastern or communist-dominated
Eastern Europe were eligible for a grant of asylum. See supra text accompanying notes 38-49.
New section 201(a)(42) of the Refugee Act defines "refugee" as "any person who is outside any
country of such person's nationality.., and who is unable or unwilling to return to... that
country because of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality.., or political opinion." Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)
(1982)). The Protocol defines a "refugee" as a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality.., or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, Art.
1, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, incorporatedby reference, Protocol, Art. I, para. A(2).
73. Comment, supra note 26, at 179.
74. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (adding § 208(a)
to the INA) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982)). This section reads:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in
the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's
status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of
the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
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Refugee Act thus implemented those modifications to United States
immigration laws which Congress steadfastly refused to acknowledge
in 1968. As a result, the 1980 measure established the first truly national policy of welcome to all refugees 75 through creation of a perma76
nent and systematic refugee admission program.
III.
A.

NOTICE OF THE RIGHT To APPLY FOR ASYLUM

CongressionalIntent Behind Refugee Act Regarding Notice

Congress' desire to help refugees is manifest throughout the
Act. 77 No limitations were placed on the number of persons who may
be granted asylum in any given year. 78 All asylum claims initiated in
either deportation or exclusion proceedings are to be accorded complete consideration. 79 Furthermore, the withholding of deportation
provision of the Refugee Act was drafted to conform with Article 33
of the Protocol.80 The House Conference Report states that this section was patterned upon the Protocol and "is intended . . . [to] be

construed consistent with the Protocol. ' 81 This provision prohibits
the Attorney General from returning any alien to a country where he
would face persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem75. S.REP., supra note 6, at 3 (statement by Senator Kennedy). It has been contended
that the asylum process has become excessively politicized thus undermining the integrity of
the system. To substantiate this allegation, proponents point to statistics indicating that refugees from nations friendly to the United States are less likely to be granted asylum than those
refugees from countries with less congenial relations with Washington. For example, in 1983,
two percent of Salvadoran applicants were granted asylum according to figures compiled by
the Center for Constitutional Rights. In 1984, this percentage increased to 2.5 percent according to the State Department. By contrast, 78 percent of the Soviet refugees and 12.5 percent of
the Nicaraguan refugees received asylum in 1984. Korn, Hiding in the Open, Student Law.,
Jan. 1986, at 26, col. 2&3. Though some condemn the politicization of the process, others see
this as a rational foreign policy tool. See, e.g., Caribbean Migration, supra note 12, at 133
(statements by Dr. Virginia Dominguez, Department of Anthropology, Duke University, who
noted the logic of the politicization of the process but condemned it as adversely reflecting on
the country's self respect).
76. S. REP., supra note 6,at 3.
77. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 374 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
78. Id.
79. Comment, supra note 26, at 180.
80. Article 33 states that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any
matter whatsoever to ... territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of... race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.C. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 160, 161.
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bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.82 In contrast
to its predecessor, the new proviso gives no discretion to withhold
deportation if the alien fulfills the statutory criteria. 83 Keying on the
language of these sections and the express humanitarian principles of
the Act, the courts in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith84 and Nunez v.
Boldin8 5 concluded that Congress intended to make asylum available
to all aliens. 86 And, they added, as the Act establishes the right to
apply for asylum, this right would be meaningless without notice of
87
its existence.

Despite this reasoning, the circuit courts remain unconvinced.
In Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, the Fifth Circuit recently refused to find a
congressionally mandated notice requirement.88 The court reasoned
that the legislative history of the Refugee Act made clear that the
amendments to section 243(h) were a recognition of Article 33, not a
call to require notice.8 9 Emphasizing this point, the courf noted that
82. See supra note 8.
83. The former section provided as follows:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the
United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of
time as he deems to be necessary....
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, § 243(h), Pub. L. No. 82-236, § 1 (f),
79 Stat. 918 (1965) (emphasis added). The section currently reads:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (emphasis added)
(amending section 243(h) of the INA).
84. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
85. 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d
755 (5th Cir. 1982).
86. Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F. Supp. at 375; Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 584.
87. Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F. Supp. at 375; Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 584.
88. 745 F.2d 937, 943-44 (5th Cir. 1984). The reasoning of the 5th Circuit provides the
most thorough analysis to date of the congressional and constitutional arguments against a
notice requirement in the case of deportable aliens. As such, the rationale from that decision is
drawn on extensively in formulating the arguments herein. Cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957
(11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (finding no notice obligation in the case of excludable aliens.) In
Ramirez-Osorio, appellants were natives of El Salvador who admitted the illegality of their
entry to the United States and requested to be returned to El Salvador. At no point did either
appellant express any fear of persecution upon refoulement. The sole contention on appeal
was that the immigration judges should have informed them of their right to seek asylum.
Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 938-39.
89. As authority for its position the court looked to the House report on § 243(h). That
section read:
(2) Withholding of Deportation-Related to Article 33 is the implementation of section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ...
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these alterations neither changed the alien's measure of entitlement
nor the ultimate administrative responsibility of the Attorney General. 90 Moreover, the court disdained the notion that notice of the
right to petition for asylum was necessary to make that right meaningful. 9' Though not disputing Congress' desire to hear the pleas of
the persecuted, the court determined that blanket notice was not the
best means to those ends. 92 Instead, the court gave its approval to

current INS procedure which furnishes an alien notice of the right to
petition for asylum if it appears he may be persecuted upon return to
his homeland. 93 The court felt it reasonable to assume that persons
who fear persecution upon refoulement would so indicate. 94 Moreover, by providing notice to "likely" asylum beneficiaries, this selective practice would uphold the Refugee Act's humanitarian purposes
without the fiscal and administrative burden a blanket notice obligation would entail. In sum, the court believed present INS procedure

satisfactorily balanced the competing
requirement.

95

concerns in any notice

The court's analysis is flawed in two respects. First, the meansends discussion borders on the irrelevant. Despite acknowledging the
Act's professed purposes, the court disdained a blanket notice requirement as not necessarily the best means to accomplish the measure's
goal. 96 This conclusion was based on an examination of the reasonableness of current INS notification procedures rather than an exacting
scrutiny of Congress' intent as discerned from the Act. 97 In fact, acAlthough this section has been held by court. . . decisions to accord to aliens the
protection required under Article 33, the Committeefeels it desirable,for the sake of
clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention (emphasis in
original).
Id. at 943 n.9 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1979)).
90. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 943.
91. Id.
92. The court stated that "[w]hile we recognize that among the purposes behind the Refugee Act was to give 'statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns,' . . . and to continue the 'historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands,' . . . blanket
notice... may not necessarily be the means best suited to those ends." Id. (quoting S.REP.
256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141 and
Refugee Act of 1980 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 respectively).
93. Id. at 943-44. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 944.
95. Id. at 943-44.
96. Id. at 943.
97. The court's emphasis upon reasonableness and practicality in lieu of an exacting inquiry into Congress' intent is manifested by its support of the government position that "this
[current INS notification procedures] practice [is] a reasonable administrative response to the

94
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knowledgment of the cosmetic changes to section 243(h) constituted
the sum and substance of the court's probe for any notice requirement
to be implied from the measure. The court, in effect, deferred to its
own practical judgment instead of focusing its inquiry upon the provisions of the Act and their mandate, if any, as decreed by Congress.
Second and more importantly, the court's assumption that aliens
who fear persecution upon refoulement will so indicate belies reality.
Inherent cultural, verbal and educational barriers heighten the interviewee's sense of alienation and anxiety, thereby reducing the willingness to volunteer information. 98 "Thege handicaps . . . result in [a]
refugee's misperception about whether, when or how to apply for asylum .... "99 Sociological impediments to optimal communication are
further buttressed by the coercive nature of many field interviews.l°0
Taken together these factors exacerbate the fear and suspicion aliens
frequently harbor towards all government officials.1 0 1 To the extent
competing concerns inherent in any prescription for the time and manner of notice." Id. at
943-44.
98. Note, supra note 3, at 912 & n.73. "It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee
status is normally in a particularly vulnerable situation. He finds himself in an alien environment and may experience serious difficulties... in submitting his case to the authorities of a
foreign country, often in a language not his own." Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Processand "Community Ties'" A Response to Martin, 44 U. Pir. L. REV. 237, 250-51 (1983) (citing Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status 45, 47 (1979)). The following passage highlights the obstacle
that language presents in the attorney-client context where the "coercive" nature of the refugee's interaction with an "official" in this country is at its ebb:
Attorney Steven Mander testified that it was very difficult to extract information
from his Haitian clients. In general, this was due to language difficulties and a certain reticence on their part. He described the gathering of information as follows:
"In understanding the actual process of putting together an application, it required
an interview, re-interview, cross-examination, extracting details, and patience."
Aleinkoff at 251 n.39 (quoting Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 522 (S.D.
Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
99. Caribbean Migration, supra note 12, at 283 (statement from letter written by Amnesty International U.S.A. to INS Acting Commissioner David Crosland).
100. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 360 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The court heard testimony from Attorney Antonio Bueno who has represented hundreds of
Salvadoran clients. Mr. Bueno stated that:
The first thing [INS agents] tell [Salvadoran detainees], of course, is that they're not
going to grant [political asylum] to them. It's going to be denied. They always tell
them that. And then the other things they tell them is [sic] that the bond is going to
be very high and no way they could post it, and that it's a waste of money. And they
paint a pretty dim picture ....

Id. Mr. Bueno's testimony was supported by the Chief Counsel for the INS who pointed out
that "the interrogative atmosphere is ...

coercive." Id. at 377.

101. CaribbeanMigration,supra note 12, at 279 (statement by the Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights). Of course a fear of government officials is often bred in the
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the foregoing elements stifle the voicing of valid claims, both the
mandatory withholding of deportation language of section 243(h) and
the Congressional desire to hear refugee concerns are undermined by
present INS procedures.
The more salient argument against a notice requirement hinted
at by the court is the lack of explicit mention of notice in the Refugee
Act. 102 Congress had the ability to include a notice provision in the
Act but refused to do so. 10 3 Moreover, they are aware of current INS
procedures yet have failed to enact any bill compelling notice.l°4 The
resulting silence must therefore be construed as an implied rejection
of a blanket notice requirement.
Though persuasive on its face, the foregoing analysis focuses on
the wrong actor's purpose to reach the conclusion. When discerning
the intent behind any law, it is the enacting Congress' design which is
critical.10 5 The views of a subsequent Congress are not appropriate to
justify the sounds of silence. 10 6 The changing legislative make-up
poses a formidable hurdle when inferring the intent of a past Congress
from the opinions of a subsequent one. Nonetheless, Congressional
alien's homeland which is a key reason many aliens risk life and limb to seek sanctuary in the
United States. See, e.g., CaribbeanMigration,supra note 12, at 148-57 and 163-66 (noting that
many Haitians left Haiti in 1980 to escape the excesses of the Duvalier government). Ironically, it seems logical to conclude that those individuals most abused by their own government
would harbor the greatest suspicion of American officials. As such, they are the most likely to
suppress their claims and be denied the relief they so desperately need. Hence, given the
court's assumptions, those aliens most in need of protection are the least likely to receive
asylum.
102. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 943 (5th Cir. 1984). The contention that Congressional silence indicates Congress' desire to foresake a blanket notice requirement is fully
developed by the government in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
103. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
104. Id. Congressional awareness of current INS practice is evidenced by a 1982 Senate
Report which approved present notice procedures. The report stated:
It is the intention of the Committee that this be a general inquiry and should not
include advice of any right to claim asylum or leading questions with respect to persecution. Only if the alien's answers to such general inquiry provide evidence that
the alien may have a well-founded fear of persecution . . . should the immigration
officer specifically inquire about persecution and the alien's desire to claim asylum.
Note, supra note 3, at 907-08 (quoting S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 34 (1982)).

105. L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (1985). Examination of prior or contemporaneous rejection of proposed amendments that would have given the statute the interpretation
that a litigant claims the statute did enact is one way to "read" this Congressional silence. Id.
106. Id. ("[Jiustifying an interpretation of a prior enactment by pointing to what a subsequent Congress did not enact seems incompatible with our constitutional struc-

ture.")(emphasis in original); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of
a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.").

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.

[Vol. 9:81

silence indicating tacit consent to existing decisional law that had construed the very language being reenacted is relevant to statutory interpretation. 10 7 Though two legislatures are involved, the focus of
inquiry remains on that body adopting the measure.
Applying these principles here renders inescapable the conclusion that Congressional failure to include a notice provision should
not be deemed a prohibition against notice. Prior to the 1980 Refugee
Act, there was no asylum provision in United States law.108 It is thus
impossible to make any statutory comparison from which to lift Congress' intent. Moreover, because of its recent enactment, the Refugee
Act was neither subject to judicial interpretation nor amended as regards the notice requirement. Little relevant information exists to interpret Congress' silence. Emphasis must then be placed on the
interplay of the statute's components to the purposes of the 1980 measure. As detailed, a notice obligation is consistent with the humanitarian designs of the Act which make clear that the nation has no
interest in deporting aliens to areas where persecution reigns. Notice
would not shield the unworthy but rather would protect eligible aliens
from wrongful refoulement. By contrast, present procedures fail to
extend notice to all aliens deserving this procedural safeguard. As a
result, often only those aliens fortunate enough to be familiar with
United States' immigration policy are awarded notice of the right to
petition for asylum. 109 This undermines Congress' desire to treat all
refugees in a uniform, nondiscriminatory manner. 0 Hence any ambiguity regarding Congress' intent argues for implying a notice
requirement.
B.
1.

Due Process

Notice at the Deportation Proceeding

Congressional intentions notwithstanding, fundamental principles of due process mandate a notice requirement." 'I While Congress
has almost unfettered power to set immigration policy,"12 the execu107.
108.
109.
110.

L. TRIBE, supra note 105, at 41 (emphasis added).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 375 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
Id.

111.

But see Note, supra note 3, at 908-16 (arguing due process does not require notice to

aliens of the right to apply for asylum).
112. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1976) ("This court has repeatedly emphasized that
,over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over'
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tive must comply with due process in implementing that policy. 13 It
is beyond dispute that an alien within the borders of the United States
is accorded due process protections. 114 Procedural due process is not
an independent right, but merely a condition precedent to the deprivation of a life, liberty or property interest.11 5 Do the United States
immigration laws create in the alien a liberty or property interest' 16,
the protection of which requires notification of the right to apply for
asylum?117 In fact, the existence of an asylum adjudicatory procedure
under section 208(a) 118 and the mandatory withholding of deportation
language of section 243(h)"9 of the Refugee Act of 1980 have been
deemed to create interests deserving of due process protection.
0
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates 12
provides the reasoning
upon which section 243(h) has been interpreted to create a protectible
liberty interest in nonrefoulement.121 In Greenholtz, the Court found
a protected liberty interest in the Nebraska parole-release statute's
language which required the Board of Parole to release a parolee barring presence of specified criteria requiring deferment. 122 The Court
rejected any contention that the parole board's broad discretion in
rendering the parole-release decision undermined an inmate's parole
expectation. 123 The Court felt the statute created a presumption of

parole. 124 Similarly, section 243(h), as amended in 1980, mandates
the Attorney General to withhold deportation if an alien can establish

the admission of aliens." (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909)).
113. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) ("[T]his court has never held
...that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty
of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of law...
Note, supra note 3, at 908.
114. Shaughnessy v. Mezzei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1982) ("[A]liens who have once passed
through our [territorial] gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of ... due process of law."); see also supra note 25.
115. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982).
116. Protected interests may originate in the Constitution itself or they may emanate in
state or federal statutes creating substantive entitlements to particular government benefits. Id.
at 1037-38 and n. 31; Note, supra note 3, at 909.
117. Note, supra note 3, at 909.
118. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 8.
120. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
121. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 3, at 909.
122. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11; Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir.
1984); Note, supra note 3, at 909.
123. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Note, supra note 3, at 910.
124. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Note, supra note 3, at 910.
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a clear probability of persecution. 125 As in Greenholtz, any subjectivity contained within the persecution evaluation is insufficient to overcome the statute's mandatory language creating a presumption of
26
nonrefoulement. 1
The United States' embrace of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1968 bolsters the notion that section 243(h) creates a protectible liberty interest. 127 By accession to
the Protocol the United States agreed, as stated in Article 33 of the
Convention, not to deport a refugee where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of political membership or opinion. The
Refugee Act was designed to bring United States law into conformity
with the Protocol, and along these lines, section 243(h) was modeled
after Article 33.128 Accession to the Protocol via the 1980 measure
thus created a justified expectation of nonrefoulement to countries
where the alien would be persecuted. 1 2 9 Effectuation of the humanitarian policy behind this international commitment lends support to a
finding that an alien be allowed the opportunity to seek political
30
asylum. 1
Regulations establishing an asylum procedure manifest a related
national resolve to adhere to our international humanitarian obligation and hear the pleas of the persecuted. Aside from their underlying
concern for human rights, these regulations have themselves been
deemed to create a constitutionally protected right to petition for asylum. 1 3 1 In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the court relied upon the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co. 132 to conclude that the right to use federal administrative procedures was an interest protected by the due process clause. 133 In conjunction with both our international commitments founded upon
adherence to the 1968 Protocol and section 243(h), the court believed
125.

Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 3, at 909.

126. Note, supra note 3, at 910.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 55-68.
128. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979); Note, supra note 3, at 910.
129. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984).
130. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
Congress created a constitutionally protected right to petition the government for political
asylum).
131. Id. at 1038-39.
132. 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (right to use State Fair Employment Practices Act adjudicatory
procedures was held to be a protectible property interest similar to a litigant's interest in seeking recourse to the courts).
133. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir.* 1982) (*Former
Fifth Circuit Case, Section 9(1) of Public Law 96-452 - October 14, 1980).
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these regulations established a clear intent to grant aliens the opportunity to forward asylum claims.1 34 Whether characterized as a liberty
or property interest, this entitlement was deemed worthy of due pro35

cess protections.
Once a protectible liberty interest is found, the critical question
becomes what process is due to protect that right.

36

"In particular, if

the Refugee Act creates in every qualified alien the right to
nonrefoulement or, alternatively, the right to apply for asylum, does
due process require the INS to give aliens notice of the right to seek
a
asylum?"1 37 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court articulated 38
flexible approach in deciding the process due in any given situation.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1039. The court noted that the constitutionally protected right was "a fragile
one." Id. The court emphasized that "It]here is no constitutionally protected right to political
asylum itself." Id. Indeed, the grant of asylum is discretionary with the Attorney General.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). The court, in essence, found that the alien has a constitutional
right to submit and substantiate his qualifications for asylum.
136. Note, supra note 3, at 911. As noted by the Supreme Court in Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982), due process entails a two-part inquiry: whether the party
was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process was his due. The Ramirez-Osorio
court assumed a right to petition for asylum existed for purposes of analysis. Ramirez-Osorio
v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984).
137. Note, supra note 3, at 911.
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (The Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not required
prior to the termination of Social Security benefits. Administrative procedures prescribing
notice and an ability to review the decision to terminate benefits prior to the cut-off date comported with due process.).
Use of the Mathews framework to the present situation should not be deemed a foregone
conclusion. The alien received notice of an impending deportation proceeding thus satisfying
the traditional due process notice requirement. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950). The issue herein focuses upon the content of the notice to be accorded the
alien. Namely, must the alien receive notice of the right to apply for asylum which is in the
nature of a substantive claim. See infra note 139 and text accompanying notes 174-75.
Notwithstanding lower court decisions to the contrary, it is not at all clear that the Mathews
test was designed to shape content of notice issues. The post-Mathews Supreme Court has
never relied upon the Mathews analysis to define the contours of notice. Cf. Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (Decided one year before Mathews, the Court noted that the content
of notice depends upon accommodation of the competing interests involved. This language,
however, was dicta as the case focused on the form of the hearing to be given a suspended high
school student.). Instead, Mathews and its progeny have dealt with the nature of the hearing
to be accorded the affected party. Examination of the rationale underlying the due process
clause justifies this line drawing.
Given that accuracy is one of the touchstones of the due process clause, see supra note
156, analysis of the government's fiscal burden in providing notice, one of the Mathews factors,
deprecates this goal through consideration of an element designed solely to prevent notice.
Truth and the right to a meaningful hearing are often the companion victims of a balance
denying enhanced notice. By contrast, in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 14 n. 15 (1978), the Supreme Court focused upon the individual characteristics of edu-
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The Ramirez-Osorio court turned to this framework when deciding if
39
notice was constitutionally mandated.1

The Mathews decision teaches that "the dictates of [procedural]
due process require consideration of three distinct factors: the individual interest at stake, the risk of mistake inherent in the procedure, and
the potential for correction by changed procedures balanced against
the additional burden they would present." 40 While recognizing the
alien's ignorance of the right to petition for asylum and the prophylactic result blanket notice would provide, the Ramirez-Osorio court
felt the ultimate fiscal burden on the government outweighed the effi-

cacy of notice. 14 1 Blanket notice would encourage frivolous claims
thereby "extend[ing] deportation proceedings for years" and adding
significant and costly administrative burdens. 142 When viewed in
cation, experience, and resources to determine the content of notice to be provided to a class of
consumers whose utilities were cut-off. No emphasis was placed on the government's fiscal
burden in providing the information. Indeed, balance of these individual factors alone limits
blanket notice of substantive rights and its concomitant cost. More importantly, however,
they serve as reasonable measures for gauging the likelihood each affected party will learn of
his rights. Hence, while recognizing the expense associated with blanket notice of substantive
rights, the Memphis Light inquiry maximizes within fiscal reason the due process accuracy
function by gearing the content of notice to the needs of the individual. This insures a meaningful hearing where before none may have existed. Once the individual is accorded meaningful notice, the hearing need not be a full evidentiary proceeding. The Mathews analysis is
ideally suited to determine the form that this hearing should take. For while many types of
proceedings may provide an adequate forum to ascertain the truth, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 33334, accuracy cannot be reached through suppression of claims owing to inadequate notice.
139. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 945 (5th Cir. 1984). The fact that the right to
apply for asylum is substantive in nature is not determinative upon the issue of whether a
notice obligation should attach. Notice of substantive rights has been demanded by at least
two circuit courts. In Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981), the court held that a
tenant class must receive notice of the right to retroactive housing assistance. And in Finberg
v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980), the court mandated notice to garnishees of the social
security exemption from garnishment.
140. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 945-46. The precise language of the Mathews
test is as follows:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
141. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 946.
142. Id. Statistics before the court indicated the number of asylum claims increased from
3,700 per year to 50,000 per year between 1978 and 1981. Id. at n.14. Facts before the
Orantes-Hernandezcourt place the increase as more severe. Asylum claims were said to have
jumped from 2,529 in 1977 to 63,202 in 1981. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351,
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light of Congress' near plenary power in the immigration field, the
against "legislating
court felt the complexity of the balance 'counseled
143
good."
public
the
of
perceptions
judicial
It is difficult to dispute the court's weighing of the identified interests at stake. Concern for the public fisc has commanded increased
attention in the due process arena.'I" Tipping the scales to reflect that
concern can hardly be deemed unreasonable or irrational. Moreover,
any disagreement with the court's analysis follows a fortiori from the
inherent subjectivity of the Mathews test.145 Judicial reliance on this
balancing doctrine creates a sort of "situational ethic" which necessarily renders unpredictable which process is due in any particular
case. 146 A court is often placed in the difficult position of damage
control through comparison of "incommensurables.' 47 Reliance
upon personal values intuitively becomes the dominant fourth factor

8
in decidedly close cases.14
Given this inherently subjective framework, issue is not taken
with the court's conclusion as to the interests it analyzed. 149 Instead

379 n.34 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Moreover while the number of yearly applicants processed reached
4,529 in 1981, the number of claims pending soared to 102,544. Id.
143. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 947.
144. The Supreme Court in Mathews emphasized its growing concern to preserve limited
resources. The court noted:
Financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining whether due process
requires a particular procedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But
the Government's interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources, is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the
benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative
action ... may be outweighed by the cost.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348; cf Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1971) (according little weight to government arguments based on minimizing expense). See generally, Frug, The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
715, 773-84 (1978) (detailing the Supreme Court's willingness to recognize the government's
interest in avoiding increased expenditures in the procedural due process and equal protection

arenas); L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

541 (1978) (noting the impact of eco-

nomic pragmatics on the individual's traditional constitutional safeguards.)
145. See Note, Specifying the ProceduresRequired by Due Process: Toward Limits on the
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1520 (1975).
146. Id. at n. 51. This "situational ethic" results because of the Supreme Court's refusal to
strike the balance of general judgment as to the conflict between the competing private and
public interests. Instead each case is examined as it arises with the trial court left to interject
its value judgment on the process. Id.
147. Id. ("Since the function of the Court in applying the balancing test is to avoid the
greater of ... two misfortunes by letting the lesser occur, the Court has placed itself in a
position where it must compare incommensurables.").
148. Id.
149. The flexibility of the Mathews test is elucidated through comparison of the RamirezOsorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984) and Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex.
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the untenability of the court's reasoning emanates from its identification of the factors to be weighed in the Mathews balance. Specifically,
the court neglected to consider the functional appropriateness of a
notice requirement for resolving asylum claims. This inquiry is a
component part of the government interest to be analyzed.15 0 Moreover, the court's focus upon the fiscal and administrative costs of notice to the government was overly inclusive. Interests properly
reserved to an analysis of the adequacy of the alien's deportation hearing were incorporated in the court's balancing scheme thereby exaggerating the INS interest involved. A closer look to the logic on the
scale is therefore appropriate.
The Mathews factors are designed to accommodate the flexible
notions of due process allowing for "such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands."' 151 The capacities and characteristics of those to be heard are important factors to be considered when
determining the fairness of existing procedures. 152 The alien's interest
in this analysis is obvious. Deportation may result in persecution or
even death to the detainee.153 Moreover, "[t]he present procedures do
not sufficiently assure that all genuine asylum claims will be heard,
nor do they assure that an alien... will not be returned to the country of his persecutors." 154 The alien's ignorance of INS procedures
and American law, the language barriers present, and the lack of appointed counsel only illuminate the likelihood that legitimate asylum
claims will fall undetected under current practice. 155 Notice of the
right to petition for asylum would undoubtedly reduce the alien's fear
1982) cases. The two courts balanced the same factors and came up with opposite conclusions.
In Ramirez-Osorio, the court felt the government's burden outweighed the efficacy of notice.
Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 946. By contrast, the Nunez court concluded that any increase in
the number of unworthy claims notice would bring about did not "override the need for those
with worthy claims to have them heard." Nunez, 537 F. Supp. at 586.
150. Analysis of the functional appropriateness of the requested procedures is frequently
obscured or missing from many courts' interest-balancing analyses. Note, supra note 145, at
1516.
151. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
152. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 & n.15 (1978).
153. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 586 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
154. Id.
155. Id. ("The majority of detainees are completely uneducated as to INS procedures.
They do not speak the English language, nor can they read the English language asylum applications required for consideration."); see also Orantes-Hernandez v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 351,
359 (1982) (noting that most aliens sign voluntary departure forms due to their unfamiliarity
with their rights under United States' immigration law); see also supra, notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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and lead to pressing of valid claims. In this way, notice promotes
truth and fairness which are the principles underlying the due process
clause. 156
Functional considerations also urge a notice obligation. This
analysis asks whether "the proposed procedure is necessary to achieve
accuracy in fact-finding. ' 157 In the asylum context, this factor takes
on a compelling magnitude when it is recalled that the alien's entitle158
ment to relief rests upon substantiating a claim of persecution.
Subjective evidence of widespread unrest engulfing a country is insufficient to sustain the required burden of proof.15 9 Documented evidence or credible, subjective testimony is necessary to establish the
legitimacy of any assertion that the alien is being singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds in section 208(a). 160 In reality,
this evidence is difficult to obtain. The hurried and embattled conditions which characterize the flight of most persons from their homeland renders highly unlikely their ability to obtain the necessary
evidence and documents to support a claim of persecution. 161 The
applicant therefore is typically the only individual available to support
an asylum request. 162 Notice ensures the integrity of the deportation

proceeding by focusing the fact-finding process on the one and often
156. The two dominant perceptions as to the primary purpose of procedural due process
are the intrinsic and instrumental approaches. The former approach sees an intrinsic value in
allowing the individual to participate in decisions fundamental to his being. This view emphasizes participation as a means of preserving the individual's dignity. The instrumental approach, by contrast, sees procedural due process as necessary to minimize mistaken
deprivations. Accuracy is a touchstone of this view. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501-03 (1978).
157. Note, supra note 145, at 1516.
158. See supra notes 10, 11, & 83.
159. See, e.g., Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Recent
Ninth Circuit decisions repeatedly have rejected applications for relief under section 243(h)
based on generalized allegations of persecution resulting from the political climate of a nation."); see also Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
eligibility for asylum based upon a showing of widespread political violence.)
160. See, e.g., Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the
applicant must allege specific facts indicating he or she will be singled out for persecution);
Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985) (following 7th Circuit's lead in establishing the amount and type of evidence necessary to show a "well-founded" fear of
persecution).
161. See Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984); Bolanos-Hernandez
v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their
victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution.").
162. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1984); Carvajal-Munoz
v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984).
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only person capable of exposing the truth. 163 Additionally, blanket
notice serves the desired function of eroding barriers inhibiting optimal communication in the initial interview process. Had the Ramirez-Osorio court channeled this factor into the equation, it may indeed
have mandated notice in light of the severe deprivation facing the
alien.
This oversight aside, the court found the fiscal burden to the government sufficiently weighty to deny notice. The court was concerned
that blanket notice would encourage the filing of frivolous claims
thereby adding to already burgeoning administrative costs.' 64 The
court, however, misapplied this third Mathews factor. The cost to be
examined is the cost of the specific procedure involved.165 Here that
procedure is notice. This cost is admittedly de minimus. The real
expense to the government stems from those consequences resulting
from a notice obligation, namely, the filing of increased claims, both
unworthy and meritorious, which will demand hearings. 166 This cost
stems from the administrative procedures which accord an alien the
opportunity to present his case. Congress, however, is free to step in
and prevent fiscal and administrative havoc by its ability to modify
present procedures regulating the form of asylum hearing.1 67 While
163. An appropriately heavy emphasis should be placed upon notice as a functional consideration in the asylum arena. Few claims to relief rely so heavily upon the testimony of the
affected individual. In most civil cases, the truth may be ascertained through objectively verifiable evidence. The number of competent witnesses often extends beyond the litigants themselves. Even in criminal cases where the defendant may be the only available defense witness,
objective circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to attack the prosecution's charges. By
contrast, in the asylum contest, objective evidence is normally difficult to obtain and insufficient to sustain the alien's standard of proof. Notice is the only way to accurately assure that
aliens deserving of relief are not being deported. This comports with the language, if not the
spirit, of sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the 1980 Refugee Act.
164. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
165. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72 (1974) (discussing each proposed procedure within a separate analysis); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388-97 (M.D. Ala.
1974); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1048-54 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
166. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 586 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The burden on the Government as a result of
this [notice] requirement is not the giving of the notice, but the likelihood of persons without
valid claims of asylum applying for that relief, thereby causing the time and expense of needless hearings .... ").
167. Note, supra note 3, at 925. To the extent the effects of a notice requirement should be
included within the interest-balancing notice formula, these effects deserve minimal merit. The
agencies involved in the application process have the ability to minimize any cost increases.
For example, the State Department currently reviews every asylum claim. This practice has
been on-going since 1963 although it is not mandated by the Refugee Act. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7 (1985). In 1982, only three full-time State Department employees and four consultants
were handling the entire application load. More federal employees or a reduction of claims for
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any new program must comport with due process, Congress nonetheless retains wide discretion in fashioning a procedure to reflect pragmatic economic conditions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that any number of hearings may yield the truth. A judicialtype proceeding with its concomitant cost is not an indispensible prerequisite to attainment of a meaningful hearing prior to many final
orders.1 68 The constitutionality of the hearing to be accorded the
alien remains to be determined wholly apart from the cost emanating
from any notice obligation. Any challenge to the hearing procedures
can adequately address the cost of frivolous claims. For while the
traditional due process principles of notice and opportunity to be
heard work jointly to guarantee fairness and promote truth-seeking,
they constitute distinct means in search of a common end. 169
2.

The Voluntary Departure Form and Principles of Waiver

As the preceding analysis notes, due process principles guarantee
the alien's right to be heard in a deportation hearing prior to refoulement. Many aliens, however, never go through this formal process
but instead opt for voluntary departure. 170 Because an alien's decision
State Department review, i.e. those considered politically sensitive, are two examples of ways
to minimize any expected backlog a notice obligation might produce. Orantes-Hernandez v.
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 379 n.35 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Another way to save expenses and increase efficiency in the larger districts is to assign exclusive asylum claim review to a specific
group of employees. Caribbean Migration, supra note 12, at 279; see also Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (rejecting the government's contention that fiscal and administrative
concerns warrant delay of an evidentiary hearing on disqualification of welfare assistance until
after discontinuance of the grants based in part on the State's ability to utilize "weapons to
minimize . . . increased costs"). See generally Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 91 (1981).
168. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
169. Judge Friendly has noted the symbiotic yet distinct roles of notice and a hearing. He
feels that the more formal and informative the notice procedures, "the stronger should be [the
government's] position in asking curtailment of other procedures." Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1281 (1975); see also Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d
146, 172 n.55 (1980) (finding that enhanced notice of termination of Medicare benefits may
obviate need and/or formality of oral hearing where "paper hearing" in place). This conclusion reflects the reasonable belief that an informed person can present his case in the most
informal of hearing processes. This reasoning is particularly compelling in the asylum sphere
where the alien is typically the only person available to substantiate a claim of persecution. See
supra notes 157-172 and accompanying text.
170. Note, supra note 3, at 916. There are advantages to both the INS and the alien when
a voluntary departure form is executed. The INS is spared the expense of providing deportation hearings. The alien benefits primarily because no deportation order will appear on his
record and thus he retains eligibility to enter the country legally at a future time. Nunez v.
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to depart voluntarily necessarily constitutes a waiver of protected
rights, two questions arise. First, must a waiver of the alien's procedural due process rights be both knowing and voluntary? If so, is
notice of the right to apply for asylum essential to ensure a knowing
and voluntary waiver? An affirmative response to both questions
would compel notice of the right to apply for asylum to effectuate a
valid waiver.
a.

Knowing and Intelligent Waiver

In Orantes-Hernandezv. Smith the court, relying on the traditional definition of waiver, held that signing a voluntary departure
form was "tantamount to a waiver to the right to apply for asylum as
well as the right to a deportation hearing."1 71 The court determined
that lack of notice of the right to apply for asylum and the resulting
speed with which the voluntary departure was effectuated amounted
to "a summary departure process."' 172 Recognizing both the alien's
right to a deportation hearing because of the life or liberty interest at
stake and the Refugee Act's grant of the right to apply for asylum to
all aliens, the court concluded that notice was necessary "[iun order to
173
execute valid and informed waivers."'
The Ramirez-Osorio Court refused to apply the Orantes-Hernandez waiver standard to deportation proceedings. The court felt
that the right to apply for asylum was analogous to an affirmative
defense.' 74 At a deportation hearing, the alien has the burden of
showing cause why he should not be deported and asylum is a claim
assertable to stay the proceedings. 75 However, neither civil nor criminal law supports the precedent that an individual be given a laundry
list of his rights before waiver is effective.' 76 Viewed in this vein, the
court noted that the language of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 17 7 was
Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 585 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692
F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
171. 541 F. Supp. 351, 376 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
172. Id. The court noted that "Salvadorans are frequently arrested, deposited in waiting
rooms, interrogated, put onto buses, and flown back to El Salvador all in a matter of hours."

Id. at 361.
173. Id. at 377.
174. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 945 (5th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 3, at 919.
175. Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 945; Note, supra note 3, at 919. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361
(Supp. V 1981) (an alien illegally within the country has the burden of proving his right to
remain in the country).
176. Note, supra note 3, at 919.
177. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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controlling.178 Simply put, "the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied [almost without exception] only to those
rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in
179
order to preserve a fair trial."'
Despite that seemingly unequivocal statement coming from
Schneckloth, scrutiny of the Supreme Court's analysis indicates no
black-letter rule guiding the application of knowing and intelligent
waivers. Indeed the letter, if not the spirit, of Schneckloth mandates a
flexible approach when determining the need for "an intentional relinquishment of a known right."' 80 Analysis of the purposes of a knowing and intelligent waiver and the practical application of such a
requirement in relation to the right asserted' 8 ' constitute the proper
focus for deciding when this strict standard attaches.
The Supreme Court articulated the knowing and intelligent
waiver standard in a case involving the validity of a criminal ,defendant's decision to forego counsel. 82 Keeping in mind the Sixth
Amendment's safeguards, the Court felt that the grave consequences
which a criminal defendant faced required a strict waiver standard to
protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process.183 Recognizing the impact that pre-trial procedures have on the
adjudicatory proceeding, the Court in subsequent decisions applied
the Johnson criteria to assure the affirmative waiver of other rights
such as the right to confrontation, to a jury trial, to a speedy trial, and
the right against double jeopardy.' 84 The Court erected this "appropriately heavy" 185 waiver standard to maintain the integrity of the
criminal trial process and its concomitant search for truth.
In Schneckloth, the Court employed the Johnson concerns to
hold that the subject of a consent search need not know of his right to
refuse consent because the individual's right to be let alone, which is
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, has little bearing on the fairness
or truth-seeking of the trial process. 8 6 In noting that the Fourth
Amendment "is not an adjunct of truth" the Court was clearly ex178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 945.
Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973)).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 241.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 242; Note, supra note 3, at 917.
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pressing its view that the purposes of fairness and truth-determining
underlying the knowing and intelligent mandate were not in play
187
here.
The Court also dismissed as impractical the requirement that police notify individuals of their right to refuse consent. In the hectic,
unstructured context of a consent search, the Court felt an officer
"could [not] make the detailed type of examination" necessary to determine if there was an intelligent and competent waiver. 188 An examination into the knowing and understanding nature of the waiver
89
was thought best left to the formalities of a structured atmosphere.
Schneckloth clearly implies then that if the purpose behind the
knowing and intelligent standard is served by the right asserted, and
implementation of the standard is practical, the principle of an intentional waiver will attach.1 90 Application of this dual test to an alien's
right to apply for asylum and his right to a deportation hearing indicates the need for a knowledgeable waiver prior to signing the voluntary departure form.191
As its name implies, due process serves, inter alia, to insurefairness and promote accuracy in the adjudicatory process. 192 Due process flexibility reflects the inherent realism that fairness must be
determined on a case by case basis. 93 The principles of due process
187. The Court emphasized its point by noting that "[tihe protections of the Fourth
Amendment are of a wholly different order [then the basic protections thought indispensable
to a fair trial], and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of
truth." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.
188. Id. at 245.
189. Id. at 244.
190. The Schneckloth court's analysis buttresses this reasoning. The Court concluded that
"[n]othing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial
rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 241.
191. The civil character of deportation proceedings is of no consequence for purposes of
this analysis. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 n.31 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
While the alien is due less protection than the criminal defendant, Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745
F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984), nevertheless "in the civil no less than the criminal area, 'Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.'" Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94
n.31 (1972) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1938)). Schneckloth principles would thus apply because the alien is due no more due process protection than the
criminal defendant. Note, supra note 3, at 918.
192. See supra note 156. As Justice Frankfurter noted in his concurring opinion in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951), "[n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at [the] truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it."
193. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see also Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 15 n.15 (1978). The breadth of due process flexibility is
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necessarily stand, like the Sixth Amendment principles recognized in
Schneckloth, as an "adjunct to the ascertainment of truth."' 94 The
due process mandate to provide notice cuts not only to the integrity of
the fact-finding process, but even more fundamentally, it preserves the
defendant's ability to invoke the adjudicatory system designed to safeguard life, liberty and property. 95 In short, the purposes behind a
knowing and intelligent waiver are identical to the underlying purposes of the due process clause and its requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, denial of notice rings of injustice considered in
light of the alien's limited resources and knowledge of this country
and its laws.' 96 Lack of notice inhibits truth-seeking to the extent
valid asylum claims are not pressed. 197 Because an alien's loss of life
and liberty is closely akin to the loss of the criminal defendant's life
and liberty,1 98 every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged
against voluntary relinquishment.

99

The fact that many aliens have

displaced themselves at considerable risk illustrates that aliens faced
with deportation would not lightly sign away the one avenue through
which their hope may be fulfilled.
underscored by the holding in Memphis Light. There the Court required a utility company to
notify its customers not only of the intent to terminate services for nonpayment but also of a
procedure to dispute bills. The Court believed the "various levels of education, experience,
and resources" of the many customers compelled this enhanced notice. Memphis Light, 426
U.S. at 14 n.15.
194. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973). As Mr. Justice Black noted:
"The Sixth Amendment stands as constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' " Id. at 236 (quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1968)).
195. Strictly speaking, waiver of the rights to apply for political asylum and to a deportation hearing does not affect an adjudicatory process which was the backdrop of the
Schneckloth principles. Note, supra note 3, at 917. In fact, a voluntary departure form signed
prior to the hearing obviates the need for a hearing. Id. However, use of a procedure designed
to eliminate the necessity for an adjudicatory proceeding would appear to call for notice of
known rights to preserve fundamental fairness. Notice here is a logical extension of the pretrial guarantees which the Supreme Court viewed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the
trial process. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238-39.
196. In Orantes-Hernandez,the Court noted that "the widespread acceptance of voluntary
departure is due in large part to the ... unfamiliarity of most Salvadorans with their rights
under the immigration laws." Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 359 (C.D. Cal.
1982); see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
197. Note, supra note 3, at 918.
198. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("Although
deportation proceedings are civil in nature, the stakes for a Salvadoran at the pre-hearing stage
are more akin to those in the criminal process - the alien who voluntarily departs to El
Salvador faces very real threats to life and liberty.") (footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 377 n.31.
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As a practical matter, notification would also not pose difficulties
in implementation. Unlike the burden placed upon an officer to determine the validity of a knowing and intelligent waiver in the informal,
spontaneous context of police investigation, the INS operates with
formal procedures in a structured environment capable of ascertaining with reasonable certainty the validity of any waiver. 20 0
The dual-prong test of Schneckloth would thus appear to require,
at a minimum, a knowledgeable waiver of the right to a deportation
hearing. This procedure serves as the alien's constitutionally protected opportunity to be heard. 20 1 Unlike the right to apply for asylum, notice of the alien's right to a deportation hearing does not
involve notification of an affirmative defense. A requirement of a
knowing and intelligent waiver in this limited context is but a logical
extension of the Schneckloth principles to the due process arena. 20 2 In
short, preservation of the fairness of the deportation process requires
an "appropriately heavy burden" on the government before a valid
3
waiver can be found. 20
Despite this minimum notice extension, the more sharply drawn
question is whether Schneckloth requires notice of the right to apply
for asylum which is in the nature of an affirmative defense. Certainly
in the civil context, current precedent does not support a conclusion
that the government must inform individuals of substantive rights
before a waiver is effective. 20 4 In the criminal field, "[a] catechism of
the constitutional rights that are waived by entry of a guilty plea is
not compelled . . . by the Constitution. ' 205 Even construed as an
affirmative claim, however, Schneckloth and existing due process principles mandate notice of the, right to apply for asylum to effectuate a
valid waiver.
Due process has traditionally required notice and an opportunity
200. Note, supra note 3, at 918.
201. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 321, 332 (1982).
202. At the present moment, the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether a
knowing and intelligent waiver is necessary in the field of procedural due process.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235.
203. Id. at 236-37. Application of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard to the
alien's right to a deportation avoids the "domino theory of Constitutional litigation." The
Supreme Court felt that too often explanatory statements in its opinions were made the basis

for extension to a wholly different situation. Hence the term "domino theory" to describe this
practice. Id. at 246. The similarities in fact and purpose between the Schneckloth principles
and the alien facing deportation circumvent any unwarranted extension of this strict waiver
standard.
204. Note, supra note 3, at 919.
205. Id. (quoting Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059, 1081 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '206
Notice serves to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing. 20 7 Adequacy of preparation is a hollow concept, however, if the alien has no recognition of
the purpose for the hearing. As the Orantes-HernandezCourt noted,
"[E]ven if the alien realizes that a deportation hearing is available,
that realization alone does not suggest that there are any grounds for
avoiding deportation. The alien whose status is clearly illegal may
well believe that nothing is to be gained from a deportation hearing. ' ' 20 8 Notice of the right to apply for asylum renders meaningful
the alien's right to a deportation hearing. This promotes fairness and
truth-seeking which are the foundational principles behind the knowing and intelligent standard. 209 Notification of the right to petition for
asylum is then a procedural device which is accorded protection by
flexible due process principles to preserve the alien's right to a meaningful deportation proceeding. The validity of any voluntary departure form should therefore be contingent upon an intentional
relinquishment of the right to a deportation hearing and the right to
apply for asylum.
b.

Voluntary Waiver

Even if the alien need not know of the right to petition for asylum to effectuate a valid waiver, any effective waiver must be voluntary in nature. 210 The inquiry thus becomes whether notice is
necessary to assure a voluntary waiver. 21' Voluntariness has not been
literally construed to mean a "knowing" choice. 212 "Except where a
person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all

. . .

statements .

.

. are 'voluntary' in the sense of

representing a choice of alternatives. ' ' 213 Strictly speaking then, any
choice between alternatives involves an element of voluntariness, even
if it constitutes nothing more than a choice between evils. 21 4 Recog206. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
207. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978).
208. Orantes-Hemandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376 n.30 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
209. See supra notes 156 and 192.
210. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1972).
211. Note, supra note 3, at 920.
212. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1972).
213. Id. (quoting Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COL. L. REV. 62, 72-73).
214. Note, supra note 3, at 920. "When for example threats are used, the situation is one
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nizing this linguistic quandry, the Court has wisely fashioned a practical policy of defining "voluntary" as a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of circumstances. 21 Factors taken into
account in this determination include, inter alia, the defendant's lack
of education, low intelligence, and lack of advice as to his constitu216
tional rights.
While the presence of voluntariness must be made on a case by
case basis, most aliens share two factors pointing to a presumptive
finding of coercion. 21 7 First, the alien signs the departure form in custody, and custody inherently implies coercion. 21 8 "As the Court concluded in Miranda v. Arizona, 219 '[u]nless adequate protective devices
are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice'. ' 220 Schneckloth also recognized the
coerciveness of custody when it found the voluntary waiver by the
accused of his right against unreasonable search and seizure because
the waiver occurred "on [the] person's familiar territory. ' 22 1
Secondly, aliens are often ignorant of American law and not well
versed in English. 222 These legal "handicaps" would appear instrumental in encouraging aliens to sign voluntary departure forms, particularly when considered in conjunction with the custodial
environment in which the voluntary departure form is executed. Similarly, the alien's lack of education only enhances the already
favorable balance enjoyed by the INS. Due to the coerciveness involved in these instances, a remedy in the form of a notice of rights
seems necessary. 22 3 At a minimum, notice of the right to a deportaof choice between alternatives, either one disagreeable, to be sure, but still subject to a choice."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224 n.7 (quoting 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826 (J. Chadbourn
Rev. 1970); see also United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1979) ("[T]he voluntariness
of the choice is always affected in some way by the exigencies of a particular situation. The
voluntariness inquiry necessarily incorporates an understanding that [the] defendant cannot be
free from conflicting concerns .... ").
215. Note, supra note 3, at 920 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226).
216. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. The Court noted that "the state of the accused's mind"
and the lack of an express notice of rights are important factors to be evaluated in assessing the
"voluntariness" of any waiver. Id. at 227.
217. Note, supra note 3, at 920.
218. Id.; see also supra note 100.
219. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
220. Note, supra note 3, at 920 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
221. Note, supra note 3, at 920 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247
(1972)).
222. Note, supra note 3, at 920.
223. In Orantes-Hernandez,the court noted that "the widespread acceptance of voluntary
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tion hearing would appear mandatory as it constitutes the alien's constitutionally protected opportunity to be heard.22 4 As noticed earlier,
however, notice of the right to a deportation hearing is meaningless
without notice of the right to petition for asylum. 22 5 The same factors
of low intelligence, lack of education, and ignorance of American law
which guide the "voluntary" waiver determination also mandate notice of the right to apply for asylum to enable the alien to "free[ly] and
rational[ly]" decide whether to voluntarily waive his right to a deportation proceeding.2 26 Without notice to the alien of these complimen-

tary rights, most "voluntary" waivers would undercut the purpose
behind the alien's due process right to notice and an opportunity to be

heard by rendering suspect the independent judgment behind the
waiver.
It has been argued that blanket notice of the right to petition for
asylum would be both burdensome to the INS and less than optimally
effective for determining refugee status among aliens. 227 Notice
would encourage both the meritorious and frivolous asylum claims
thereby increasing INS processing costs due to the necessity of hold-

ing more hearings. 228 Ironically, the argument concludes, the INS
will have fewer resources to delegate to the meritorious claims thereby

"imperil[ing] the identification of non-frivolous claims.

'229

departure is due in large part to the coercive effect of the practices and procedures employed
by the INS." 541 F. Supp. 351, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
224. The alien is given such notice as the voluntary departure form states that the signer
retains the right to ask for a deportation hearing at any time prior to departure. Id. at 376
n.30. The efficacy of this notice is drawn into question when, as in Orantes-Hernandez,aliens
are not given a copy of the form listing this right to a hearing. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying note 209.
226. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1966).
227. See Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 946 (5th Cir. 1984); Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 3, at 921.
228. See supra notes 7 and 142. Prior to the Orantes-Hernandezdecision which obligated
the INS to give Salvadorans notice of their right to apply for political asylum, Salvadorans
elected voluntary departure by a six to one ratio. After the court's ruling, this ratio was nearly
reversed. Note, supra note 3, at 923 & n.147.
229. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 946 (5th Cir. 1984); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d
957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984); Note, supra note 3, at 924. These courts and commentators fear
that if the number of asylum claims rises significantly, group profiles will replace individual
scrutiny as the ultimate determinant for asylum eligibility. The shorthand response to this
argument is that group profiles utterly fail to uphold the language and spirit of the asylum
provision of the 1980 Refugee Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). This proviso contemplates analysis of each applicant's credibility and eligibility on an individual basis. The statute's emphasis
upon the singular noun "alien" indicates as much. Reliance on group profiles leads to sweeping generalizations which would thwart Congress' express desire to maintain uniform, nondiscriminatory treatment of all aliens.
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This argument finds support in the dissenters' opinions in Miranda.230 In Miranda,the Court mandated that the law enforcement
officers inform a person of his right to remain silent and his right to an
attorney prior to commencement of custodial interrogation.23l The
Court felt notice was not only the most effective device to reduce the
coercion inherent in custody but also "enhanc[ed] the integrity of the
fact-finding processes. ' 232 Like other rights designed to secure a defendant's right to a fair trial, these rights must be affirmatively
waived. The dissenters, however, were very concerned "over the costs
and risks of [the majority's] experiment." Moreover, they noted that
"[t]here can be little doubt that the Court's new Code would markedly decrease the number of confessions. ' 233 Simply put, the dissenters' argument appears to be that the notice requirement will reduce
the number of confessions obtained thereby necessitating more trials
with their increased expense. Similarly in the deportation context,
aliens who are given notice will forsake the voluntary departure route
and press their claims in more costly deportation hearings.
Despite the seeming persuasiveness of the argument, it is without
merit. There is reason to believe the number of nonmeritorious claims
will actually decrease if fair asylum procedures are implemented.2 3 4
Once satisfied that the asylum process is reliable, courts will no longer
feel compelled to halt proceedings pending development of adequate
procedures. 235 Aliens who do not fulfill the requisite burden of proof
will be deported. 236 "The message to the world will be that the mere
filing of an asylum claim is no longer a one-way ticket to the United

States."237
Even more fundamentally, the underlying premise of the "cost of
notice" logic is flawed. Notice is linked by this argument to the government's chances of "winning".23 1 Such linkage is on its face patently unfair. Taken to its logical conclusion, notice would never be
required for it would always serve to enlighten the defendant at the
expense of the government. Due process under this reading would
230. Note, supra note 3, at 921-22.
231. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
232. Id. at 466.
233. Id. at 516 (Harlan, J. dissenting) and id. at 541-42 (White, J. dissenting).
234. Aleinikoff, supra note 98, at 256-57.
235. Id. at 257.
236. Id. at 255, 257.
237. Id. at 257.
238. In the criminal context the result would be more confessions whereas in the deportation sphere, more voluntary departure forms would be executed.
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become a concept devoid of content with form elevated over substance. Due process principles have never taken into account the government's chances of victory when expanding its procedural
protection. 239 Any resulting expense is therefore an unavoidable by24 °
product of the rights to be preserved.
IV.

CONCLUSION

United States immigration law has steadily evolved to reflect a
heightened awareness of the plight of the refugee. Gone, arguably,
are those days when refugee policy was viewed as less an aid to the
persecuted than a tool to stem the spread of Communism. Congress
expressly rejected linking refugee admission standards to foreign policy objectives when it enacted the 1980 Refugee Act. As the culmination of the liberalization of American immigration policy, this
measure codified our international obligation to shoulder a fair burden of the burgeoning refugee problem. Now, all asylum claims are to
be handled in a uniform nondiscriminatory manner. More importantly, the Act reaffirmed the nation's immigrant heritage which so
many Americans had come to fear.2 4 ' In this respect, the legislation
bolstered the very principles and moral precepts upon which this
24 2
country was founded.
Despite Congress' efforts, the courts have been slow to recognize
the increased rights of aliens. 243 Specifically, no circuit court has
found a congressionally or constitutionally based obligation to give
aliens notice of their right to apply for asylum. Concern for the public fisc underscores the courts' reluctance to accord aliens this procedural protection. Deference has been extended to current INS
notification procedures which avoid providing blanket notice to aliens
but not to decline to give any notice at all. 244 This practice has woven
an asylum safety net where often only the informed assert their rights.
239. The Mathews framework for determining the dictates of procedural due process does
not remotely weigh the government's likelihood of winning into the balance. See supra note
140 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text which indicate that any substantial
expense emanating from a notice obligation lies not in the notice itself, but the procedures
designed to accord the alien a hearing.
241. Kennedy, Foreword to 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. at 2 (1981).
242. Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 587 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed without published opinion, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
243. Note, supra note 57, at 496.
244. Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 1984).
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The express Congressional desire to treat all refugees evenhandedly is
thus undermined.
Reliance upon present INS procedure also flouts due process
principles. The cost of providing notice does not outweigh the alien's
interest in nonrefoulement. Any appreciable increase in expense results from the consequences of notice, namely, the hearing to be accorded the alien. Congress may, however, modify the deportation
proceeding in any manner that comports with due process. This provides a significant check on any fiscal or administrative burden that
may result from a notice requirement.
Refugees will continue to migrate to our shores in the hopes of
attaining asylum. Our historical pledge to aid the persecuted
welcomes this call of the needy. Undoubtedly, some unworthy refugees will seek to take advantage of this beneficence. Nonetheless, a
notice mandate would not provide asylum to any unworthy applicants. Rather, legitimate claimants would be given an opportunity to
present their fears in an asylum proceeding. The Refugee Act and
due process demand as much. To provide less opportunity amounts
to a "sacrilege" of those principles upon which the Constitution was
245
founded.
Michael J. Nelson
245.

Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. at 587.

